

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-02 SSO-00 MC-02 SS-15 NSCE-00 NSC-05

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: MASS, JO, US

SUBJECT: ROSENTHAL RESOLUTION ON JORDAN HAWK

REF; AMMAN 4293

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE LETTER RESPONDING TO
ROSENTHAL RESOLUTION AND ATTACHMENTS.

QUOTE: DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION STATED IN
H. RES. 552 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, I AM HAPPY TO
PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE COMMITTEE TO CLARIFY THE SALE TO
JORDAN OF BOTH THE HAWK AND REDEYE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE
SYSTEMS. ANSWERS TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS POSED IN HOUSE
RESOLUTION 552 ARE ATTACHED.

BOTH SALES WERE UNDERTAKEN AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERA-
TION BY APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT

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AND AFTER CAREFULLY WEIGHING ALL FACTORS BEARING ON US
INTERESTS IN THE AREA AND OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN.
THIS PARTICULAR TRANSACTION WAS NOT TAKEN IN ISOLATION, BUT
WAS CONSIDERED IN THE OVERALL PERSPECTIVE OF PAST, CURRENT,

AND PROJECTED EVENTS THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE POLICIES OF OTHER STATES TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST.

OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. JORDAN HAS SUPPORTED OUR BROADER GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HAS ENCOURAGED MODERATION, AND HAS CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE PEACE OF THE REGION. THE LENGTH OF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAELI-ADMINISTERED TERRITORY ON THE WEST BANK AND AT JORDAN'S GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION BETWEEN ISRAEL, SYRIA, IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA MAKES CLEAR THE IMPORTANCE OF A MODERATE JORDAN WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE UNITED STATES AS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND TRANQUILITY.

AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THE MAINTENANCE OF SUCH A RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN THE ABILITY OF JORDAN TO PROJECT ITSELF FROM ATTACK AND THE WILLINGNESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSISTANCE IN ENABLING IT TO MAINTAIN SUCH AN ABILITY. FOR THIS REASON WE HAVE COLLABORATED CLOSELY IN HELPING JORDAN MEET ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS SINCE 1970, IN THE WAKE OF JORDANIAN ACTIONS TO REPEL OUTSIDE ATTACK, SUPPRESS PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY INTERNALLY AND GENERALLY ESTABLISH SECURITY. SINCE THAT TIME, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN TO REPLACE COMBAT LOSSES AND ASSIST IN THE MODERNIZATION OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES. THERE HAVE BEEN REGULAR MEETINGS AT LEAST ONCE A YEAR SINCE 1970 BETWEEN TOP LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S. AND JORDANIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS. CONGRESS HAS SUPPORTED THIS POLICY BY APPROPRIATING THE FOLLOWING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNDS:

GRANT MATERIEL (MILLIONS)	FMS CREDITS
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1970 - \$.2	1973 - \$33.5	1970 - \$0	1973 - \$ 0
1971 - \$28.9	1974 - \$39.0	1971 - \$30	1974 - \$ 0
1972 - \$38.0	1975 - \$59.9	1972 - \$10	1975 - \$30

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JORDAN'S NEED FOR AN AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND ITS SUPPLY BY THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SINCE THAT TIME. THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST GAVE PARTICULAR URGENCY TO THIS QUESTION. JORDAN, ALONE AMONG ITS NEIGHBORS, HAS NO VIABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM AND ITS INTEREST IN IMPROVING ITS AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES GREW AS A RESULT OF INCREASING QUANTITIES OF SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT IN THE INVENTORIES OF NEIGHBORING STATES AND THE OFFERS TO JORDAN OF AIR DEFENSE WEAPONRY MANUFACTURED IN THE USSR AND WESTERN EUROPE. THE U.S. SUPPLY OF SOME TYPE OF AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM FOR JORDAN THUS BECAME A GAUGE OF OUR

RELATIONSHIP TO THAT COUNTRY AND OUR SUPPORT FOR ITS MODERATE POLICIES DURING A PERIOD WHEN IT WAS INCREASINGLY UNDER PRESSURE AND ISOLATED FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES PRECISELY BECAUSE OF ITS MODERATE STAND.

WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, IN PRINCIPLE IN FEBRUARY 1975, THE JORDANIAN REQUEST WAS REVIEWED COMPREHENSIVELY WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DURING 1974, AND IN EARLY 1975 THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CONDUCTED A STUDY BASED ON IN-COUNTRY REVIEW OF JORDANIAN AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS. THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY TEAM, TOGETHER WITH COMMENTS BY THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE, AND FURTHER SPECIFIC REQUESTS BY THE JORDANIANS WERE REVIEWED BY THE PRESIDENT PRIOR TO REACHING A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE IN FEBRUARY 1975, WHICH WAS COMMUNICATED TO KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN ON APRIL 29. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON A MODEST AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM AND TRAINING PACKAGE, TO BE PHASED OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS. THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE LETTER OF OFFER, ARE NOW BEING WORKED OUT.

IN PROVIDING THE COMMITTEE WITH INFORMATION ON THESE TWO ARMS SALES WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE REQUESTS CONTAINED IN H.R. 552. AS I AM SURE THE COMMITTEE WILL RECOGNIZE AND APPRECIATE, MANY OF THE QUESTIONS SEEK INFORMATION WHICH IS RELATED TO THE SECURITY POSTURE OF A FRIENDLY COUNTRY WITH WHICH WE HAVE HAD A LONG AND EXTENSIVE MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. UNAUTHORIZED EXPOSURE OF CERTAIN DETAILS MIGHT JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF JORDAN, AS WELL AS OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THAT COUNTRY. OTHER QUESTIONS SEEK INFORMATION ABOUT A CONTRACTING PROCESS WHICH IS NOT YET COMPLETE. STILL OTHER QUESTIONS TOUCH ON LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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THE NATURE OF ADVICE AND RECOMMENDATIONS PROVIDED TO THE PRESIDENT AND ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH INTERNAL DECISION PROCESSES.

NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT WITHIN THESE CONSTRAINTS TO PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION WE BELIEVE ADEQUATE TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PURPOSES AND POLICIES UNDERLYING THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO PROVIDE HAWK AND REDEYE MISSILES TO JORDAN. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE H.R. 552 IS UNNECESSARY.

SINCERELY,
MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

(1) HOW AND WHEN THE SALE TO JORDAN OF THE HAWK AND REDEYES MISSILE SYSTEM WERE INITIATED, INCLUDING THE DATE, NATURE, AND SUBSTANCE OF THE FIRST APPROACH OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN TO ANY AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES?

-AND-

(2) WHAT MILITARY EQUIPMENT, IF ANY, IN ADDITION TO THE HAWK AND REDEYE MISSILE SYSTEMS WERE SOUGHT BY JORDAN AT OR ABOUT THE TIME OF THIS APPROACH?

ANSWER:

THE ARMED FORCES OF JORDAN HAVE FELT A NEED FOR AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM SINCE THE 1967 WAR. THIS NEED WAS CLEARLY STATED IN 1970, AT THE TIME OF THE SYRIAN INCURSION INTO JORDAN AND WAS CONFIRMED IN THE FINDINGS OF THE U.S. OFFICIALS WHO CONDUCTED AN ANALYSIS OF JORDANIAN MILITARY NEEDS AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, AT THAT POINT THE DEGREE OF SEVERITY OF THE AIR THREAT, AND THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF AIR DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEMS WERE NOT FULLY RECOGNIZED. A HIGHER PRIORITY AND URGENCY WAS PLACED ON GROUND EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS TANKS, AND JORDAN HAD TIGHT BUDGETARY RESTRAINTS. FOR THESE REASONS, JORDAN DID NOT PRESS ITS REQUEST, ALTHOUGH IT HAD COMMUNICATED TO THE USG ITS DESIRE FOR AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS, INCLUDING HAWKS AND REDEYES.

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SUBSEQUENTLY, IN MARCH 1973, THE UNITED STATES WAS ASKED TO REEVALUATE THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR JORDAN. AGAIN THE NEED FOR AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM WAS STATED BY THE JORDANIAN MILITARY, UNDERSTOOD BY THE U.S. ANALYSTS, BUT RELEGATED TO A LESSER PRIORITY. AIR DEFENSE WAS NOT INCLUDED IN SUBSEQUENT ARMS TRANSFERS STEMMING FROM THE EARLY 1973 ANALYSIS.

THE OCTOBER 1973 MIDEAST WAR CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THE VULNERABILITY OF JORDANIAN GROUND FORCES TO AIR ATTACK. AS A RESULT, JORDANIAN PRESSURES TO OBTAIN AIR DEFENSE BECAME INTENSE. THESE CONCERNS WERE CLEARLY STATED TO THE UNITED STATES ON MANY OCCASIONS BY MANY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT.

THE EXTENSIVE ARMS REQUEST LIST WHICH JORDAN SUBMITTED IN DECEMBER 1973 INCLUDED A MIX OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, ARMOR, ARTILLERY, AND AIRCRAFT AND THREE TYPES OF AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS IN ADDITION TO THE HAWK: THE REDEYE MISSILE, THE CHAPARRAL MISSILE, AND THE VULCAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN. THIS REPRESENTED THE POINT IN TIME WHEN VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BEGAN ON PROVIDING AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. AT A CONFERENCE HELD IN 1974, THE US AND JORDANIAN REPRESENTATIVES AGREED TO CONSIDER ONLY A MUCH REDUCED VERSION OF THE DECEMBER REQUEST AS THE BASIS FOR A GRANT AID AND FMS CREDIT PROGRAM TO BE FUNDED IN FY 1975. THE RESULTING ABBREVIATED LIST INCLUDED NO AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS; HOWEVER, JORDANIAN REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED THEIR CONTINUED

INTEREST IN OBTAINING SUCH EQUIPMENT.

(3) WHETHER AND WHEN THE REQUEST WAS REFERRED TO THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, AND ANY RECORDED CONCLUSIONS MADE BY THAT OFFICE WITH RESPECT TO THE SIGNIFICANCE, POTENTIAL IMPACT, AND PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED SALE.

ANSWER:

THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS ALL OTHER APPRO-
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PRIATE AND CONCERNED PORTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN CONSTANT EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF ALL ASPECTS OF ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN SINCE THE INCEPTION OF OUR CLOSE MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP IN 1970. THE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW AND MODIFICATION TO REFLECT THE REALITIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, AND THE OBJECTIVES OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE REGION. CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENTS FROM THAT OFFICE HAVE BEEN INTEGRATED INTO OTHER STUDIES AND ARE REFLECTED IN THE FINAL DECISIONS IN THE MATTER.

(4) WHETHER AND WHEN THE REQUEST WAS REFERRED TO THE BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND ANY RECORDED CONCLUSIONS MADE BY THE BUREAU WITH RESPECT TO THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE REQUESTED SALE UPON UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL, AND WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST, IN PARTICULAR, INCLUDING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE REQUESTED SALE ON THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, THE DEFENSE OF ISRAEL AND ISRAELI-ADMINISTERED TERRITORY, RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE OTHER ARAB STATES, RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS, THE POLITICAL STABILITY OF JORDAN, INCLUDING THE MAINTENANCE IN POWER OF THE HUSSEIN REGIME, AND THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN JORDAN.

ANSWER:

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INCLUDING THE BUREAUS OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS AND NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS CONSIDERED THOROUGHLY THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE JORDANIAN REQUEST UPON UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL AND WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST. THE ABSENCE OF EVEN A NOMINAL AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM FOR JORDAN HAD BECOME, BY LATE 1974, A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN AND ITS ARMY, THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND THE OVERALL POLICY WHICH JORDAN WOULD

PURSUE IN THE FUTURE. MORALE AMONG THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES HAD DETERIORATED AS A RESULT OF THEIR VULNERABILITY TO AIR ATTACKS, YET A LOYAL, EFFECTIVE ARMY IS CLEARLY AN INDISPENSABLE SUPPORT FOR KING HUSSEIN AND HIS POLICIES.
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NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SUCH AS SYRIA AND IRAQ HAD EXCELLENT AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS SUPPLIED BY THE USSR, WHILE ISRAEL, IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA HAD AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES.

AT THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING IN RABAT IN NOVEMBER, 1974 SUBSIDIES WERE PLEDGED FOR THE PURPOSE OF JORDANIAN MILITARY PURCHASES, THUS REMOVING A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE ACQUISITION OF AIR DEFENSE WEAPONRY. IN THE ABSENCE OF A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES ON THE SUPPLY OF AIR DEFENSE WEAPONRY, ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF SUPPLY BECAME REAL POSSIBILITIES. MISSILES MANUFACTURED BY OTHER COUNTRIES WERE OFFERED TO JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN AND HIS ADVISORS DID NOT ACCEPT THESE OFFERS, REITERATING THEIR PREFERENCE FOR A CONTINUING CLOSE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE KING ALSO MADE CLEAR THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF A DEAL WITH THE US FOR AIR DEFENSE WEAPONRY.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONCLUDED IN DECEMBER 1974 THAT THE DISPATCH OF AN AIR DEFENSE SURVEY TEAM TO JORDAN WOULD BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES, STRENGTHENING HUSSEIN'S INTERNAL POSITION AND REINFORCING JORDAN'S POLICIES OF MODERATION AT A TIME WHEN JORDAN WAS UNDER HEAVY POLITICAL PRESSURE FROM OUTSIDE FORCES (INCLUDING THE PLO) AND WHEN THE MORALE OF ITS ARMED FORCES WAS SUFFERING FROM THE ABSENCE OF ANY AIR DEFENSE. THE SALE OF HAWK AND REDEYE MISSILES, IT WAS JUDGED, WOULD NOT ALTER THE OVERWHELMING MILITARY SUPERIORITY WHICH ISRAEL ENJOYS VIS-A-VIS JORDAN, BUT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE CONFIDENCE OF THE JORDANIAN MILITARY IN THEIR ABILITY TO DETER ATTACK ON THEIR COUNTRY FROM ANY DIRECTION, THUS HELPING TO SUPPORT A MODERATE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND MAINTAIN ITS CLOSE TIES TO THE US. THE PRESIDENT APPROVED THE STATE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATION FOR THE DISPATCH OF THE AIR DEFENSE SURVEY TEAM TO JORDAN.

(5) WHETHER AND WHEN THE REQUEST WAS REFERRED TO THE SYSTEMS PROJECT MANAGER OF A MILITARY SERVICE, AND ANY RECORDED CONCLUSIONS OF THAT MANAGER WITH RESPECT TO THE
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SALE, INCLUDING CONCLUSIONS AS TO PRICE, DELIVERY DATE, AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY PRODUCTION NEEDS, TOGETHER WITH ANY RECORD OF THE FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS THAT MANAGER BROUGHT TO BEAR IN MAKING THOSE CONCLUSIONS.

ANSWER:

BECAUSE OF ITS COMPLEXITY, THE JORDANIAN REQUEST FOR AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS WAS EVALUATED ON THE TECHNICAL LEVEL BY A TEAM OF EXPERTS FROM THE SERVICES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE OFFICE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THE TEAM WAS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT AN ANALYSIS BASED ON IN-COUNTRY EXAMINATION OF JORDAN'S AIR DEFENSE POSTURE TO ASSIST IN REACHING DECISIONS ON APPROPRIATE US ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN IN THIS AREA. THE TEAM, REPRESENTING ALL SERVICE VIEWS, SURVEYED THE JORDANIAN REQUIREMENTS, ANALYZED THE NATURE AND ADEQUACY OF AIR DEFENSES IN JORDAN IN FEBRUARY 1974, AND OUTLINED OPTIONS FOR AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. THE TEAM'S REPORT DESCRIBED THE ESTIMATED PRICE AND AVAILABILITY OF THE PERTINENT US WEAPONS, THE MILITARY IMPACT OF EACH OPTION ON NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINING AND FOLLOW-ON MAINTNEANCE. IN DEVELOPING THIS INFORMATION THE TEAM MAINTAINED CONTACTS AND OBTAINED REQUISITE INFORMATION FROM APPROPRIATE LOGISTICAL AGENCIES AND SYSTEMS MANAGERS WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICES.

(6) WHETHER AND WHEN A PRICE AND ADVISABILITY STATEMENT WAS PREPARED BY THE SYSTEMS PROJECT MANAGER WITH RESPECT TO THE REQUESTED SALE, AND THE CONTENTS OF THAT STATEMENT.

ANSWER:

PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA, AND SUITABILITY OF HAWK, REDEYE AND OTHER WEAPONS SYSTEMS WERE CONSIDERED BY APPROPRIATE SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING PROJECT MANAGERS. SOME CHANGES IN PRICE AND AVAILABILITY HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.

(7) WHETHER THE STATEMENT REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH (6) WAS PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN, AND ANY REACTIONS OF THAT GOVERNMENT OT THE STATEMENT.
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ANSWER:

DURING THE REGULAR CONFERENCE BETWEEN US AND JORDANIAN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES HELD IN EARLY 1975, US OFFICIAL BRIEFED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES ON THE FINDINGS OF THE AIR DEFENSE TEAM. AS A RESULT OF THIS DISCUSSION THE JORDANIANS MADE SOME MINOR REFINEMENTS IN

THEIR PROPOSED AIR DEFENSE PACKAGE, AND CONFIRMED THEIR DESIRE TO PURCHASE HAWK, REDEYE AND OTHER AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS.

(8) THE IDENTITY OF ANY OTHER PERSON OR PERSONS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, AND ANY MEMBER OR MEMBERS OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE, WHO EVALUATED THE REQUEST, WHEN EACH SUCH EVALUATION WAS MADE, AND ANY RECORDED CONCLUSIONS OF EACH EVALUATING PERSON AS TO THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE REQUESTED SALE ON THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND ISRAELI-ADMINISTERED TERRITORY, RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE ARAB STATES, RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS, THE POLITICAL STABILITY OF JORDAN, INCLUDING THE MAINTENANCE IN POWER OF THE HUSSEIN REGIME, AND THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN JORDAN.

ANSWER:

AS NOTED IN THE REPLY TO QUESTION NUMBER FOUR, FACTORS SUCH AS BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, ETC., WERE ALL CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF REACHING A FINAL DECISION ON THE OFFER OF AIR DEFENSE WEAPONRY TO JORDAN. THESE FACTORS WERE ANALYZED BY THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. THE PRESIDENT MADE THE FINAL DECISION ON THE OFFER OF AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS TO JORDAN BASED ON THE COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF HIS PRINCIPAL NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISERS.

(9) THE CONTENTS OF ANY LETTER OF OFFER PREPARED WITH RESPECT TO THE REQUESTED SALE, AND WHETHER SUCH A LETTER LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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OF OFFER WAS PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN, TOGETHER WITH ANY REACTIONS OF THAT GOVERNMENT TO ANY SUCH LETTER SO PRESENTED.

ANSWER:

THE LETTER OF OFFER WILL CONSIST OF THE STANDARD LEGAL CONDITIONS WHICH OUTLINE THE LIABILITIES AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PURCHASER AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PURSUANT TO THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT, AS AMENDED. THE LETTER OF OFFER WILL ALSO LIST MAJOR ITEMS TOGETHER WITH ALL SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR MAKING THE SYSTEM OPERATIONAL BY QUANTITY, ESTIMATED PRICE AND DELIVERY COMMITMENT TIME FRAME AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION ESSENTIAL FOR COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE OF THE CASE AFTER ACCEPTANCE. THE LETTER OF OFFER

HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED AND HAS NOT BEEN PRESENTED TO THE CONGRESS OR THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN. THEREFORE NO REACTION TO ITS CONTENTS HAS BEEN RECEIVED.

(10) THE DETAILS OF ANY FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY JORDAN FOR SUCH SALE, INCLUDING SOURCES OF FUNDS, CASH, AND CREDIT TERMS, AND ANY OTHER EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT CONDITIONS OF FINANCING.

ANSWER:

THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN WILL BE ENTERED ON THE LETTER OF OFFER AS A DEPENDABLE UNDERTAKING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER 2, SECTION 22 OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT, AS AMENDED. UNDER THESE TERMS THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN MAKES A FIRM COMMITMENT TO PAY THE FULL COST OF THE CONTRACT AND TO MAKE AVAILABLE ALL NECESSARY FUNDS IN SUCH AMOUNTS AND AT SUCH TIMES AS DEMANDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. JORDAN HAS NOT REQUESTED AND THE USG HAS NOT OFFERED EITHER GRANT OR CREDIT ASSISTANCE FOR THE PURCHASE OF AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS. THE ADMINISTRATION UNDERSTANDS THAT JORDAN CAN EXPECT ASSISTANCE FROM FRIENDLY ARAB GOVERNMENTS IN FINANCING THE HAWK AND REDEYE PURCHASES.

(11) AT WHAT POINT, IF ANY, THE SALE IS TO BE REFERRED TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT, AS AMENDED.

ANSWER:

THE LETTER OF OFFER IS CURRENTLY BEING STAFFED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THIS STAFFING WILL BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE PROPOSED LETTER OF OFFER TO BE REPORTED TO CONGRESS SOMETIME LATE IN JULY OR EARLY AUGUST.

(12) THE DETAILED SUBSTANCE OF THE COMMUNICATION (AND ITS DATE) OF THE FAVORABLE DISPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE REQUESTED SALE, AND WHETHER ANY CONDITIONS WERE PLACED BY THE UNITED STATES ON THE MAKING PUBLIC OF THE FACT OR SUBSTANCE OF SUCH COMMUNICATION.

ANSWER:

ON APRIL 15, THE PRESIDENT APPROVED THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEFENSE THAT THE US AGREE, IN PRINCIPAL, TO SELL THE HAWK SYSTEM, AS WELL AS OTHER AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS, TO JORDAN. OUR AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN COMMUNICATED THIS DECISION TO KING HUSSEIN PRIOR TO HIS

VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

BY THE TIME OF KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN APRIL 1975, THE JORDANIANS HAD SUBMITTED THEIR FINAL REQUIREMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. THE PRESIDENT TOOK THE JORDANIAN ASSESSMENT OF ITS REQUIREMENTS INTO ACCOUNT IN MAKING THE FINAL DECISION TO PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING TO JORDAN, INCLUDING THE HAWK AND REDEYE. THIS DECISION WAS COMMUNICATED TO KING HUSSEIN DURING HIS VISIT ON APRIL 29.

THE USG PLACED ON CONDITIONS UPON MAKING IT PUBLIC (SEE QUESTION 13).

(13) THE DATE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OF THE SALE, AND THE RECORDED CONCLUSIONS, IF ANY, OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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TO THE EFFECT OF SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT ON UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND JORDANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, OTHER ARAB STATES, AND THE PALESTINIANS.

ANSWER:

THE AIR DEFENSE DECISION WAS NOT ANNOUNCED, SINCE WE DO NOT AS A MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY ANNOUNCE DECISIONS TO PROCEED WITH PREPARATION OF A LETTER OF OFFER. IN EARLY MAY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE DID RESPOND TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS ABOUT THE SALE OF AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS TO JORDAN BY NOTING THAT, IN THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW, THE SALE OF SUCH WEAPONS WOULD NOT UPSET THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE REGION.

(14) A DESCRIPTION OF THE FUNCTION, PURPOSE, MODE OF OPERATION, AND OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF EACH OF THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF THE HAWK AND REDEYE MISSILE SYSTEMS.

WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY, ON REQUEST, IN CLASSIFIED FORM.

(15) THE IDENTITIES OF THOSE NATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS FURNISHED, OR TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE A COMMITMENT TO FURNISH, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, EACH OF THE COMPONENTS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH (14).

ANSWER:

THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN PROVIDED WITH THE HAWK

MISSILE SYSTEM: ISRAEL, GREECE, IRAN, KOREA, TAIWAN, JAPAN, KUWAIT, SPAIN (UNDER FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROCEDURES); SAUDI ARABIA, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, FRANCE, ITALY, SWEDEN AND DENMARK (UNDER COMMERCIAL CONTRACT).

THE UNITED STATES HAS AGREED TO FURNISH THE REDEYE SYSTEM TO THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES BESIDES JORDAN: ISRAEL, AUSTRALIA, SWEDEN, GREECE, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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DENMARK.

(16) THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF ALL AGREEMENTS DOCUMENTS, LETTERS, MEMORANDUMS, AND/OR OTHER WRITTEN MATERIAL IN THE POSSESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHICH RELATE TO ALL PRECAUTIONS BEING TAKEN TO INSURE THAT ACCESS TO THE HAWK MISSILE SYSTEM, AND TO TECHNICAL INFORMATION ABOUT ITS COMPONENTS, WHETHER SOLD OR GIVEN TO JORDAN, DOES NOT EXTEND, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BEYOND JORDANIAN PERSONNEL.

ANSWER:

THE PROPOSED LOA FOR THE HAWK MISSILE SYSTEM WILL CONTAIN A STANDARD PROVISION WHICH CARRIES OUT THE INTENT OF SECTION 3(A) OF THE FMSA. THIS PROVISION STATES THAT NONE OF THE DEFENSE ARTICLES, COMPONENTS, ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT, OR TECHNICAL INFORMATION PROVIDED UNDER THE SALES AGREEMENT CAN BE TRANSFERRED TO ANY PERSON, ORGANIZATION, OR OTHER GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE USG.

MOREOVER, DOD CAREFULLY EVALUATES A POTENTIAL RECIPIENT COUNTRY'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF US-SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT, AND THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE SUCH SECURITY IS REQUIRED BEFORE SALES ARE MADE.

(17) THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF ALL AGREEMENTS, DOCUMENTS, LETTERS, MEMORANDUMS, AND/OR OTHER WRITTEN MATERIAL IN THE POSSESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHICH RELATE TO ALL PRECAUTIONS BEING TAKEN TO INSURE THAT NEITHER THE HAWK MISSILE SYSTEM NOR ANY OF ITS COMPONENTS FALLS UNDER THE COMMAND, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, OF OTHER THAN JORDANIAN PERSONNEL, INCLUDING ANY STEPS WHICH ARE BEING OR WHICH SHALL BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENTS FOR JOINT MILITARY COMMAND BETWEEN JORDAN AND ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

ANSWER:

THE NO-TRANSFER PROVISIONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTION (16) WOULD PROHIBIT JORDANIAN AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY

THE US FROM COMING UNDER THE COMMAND OF OTHER THAN
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JORDANIAN PERSONNEL. THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO WAY TO ENSURE ABSOLUTELY THAT JORDAN WILL COMPLY WITH US LAWS UNDER ALL CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, THE JORDANIAN RECORD OF COMPLIANCE HAS BEEN EXCELLENT. AT THIS MOMENT WE KNOW OF NO PLANS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT MILITARY COMMAND BETWEEN JORDAN AND ANY OTHER COUNTRY, AND OUR DECISION TO PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS TO JORDAN REDUCES THAT POSSIBILITY.

(18) THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF ALL AGREEMENTS, DOCUMENTS, LETTERS MEMORANDUMS, AND/OR OTHER WRITTEN MATERIAL IN THE POSSESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHICH RELATE TO ALL CONTACTS, IN PERSON OR OTHERWISE, BETWEEN PERSONNEL OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, INCLUDING EMPLOYEES OF THE STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS, AND ANY REPRESENTATIVES OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY WITH RESPECT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, TO THE HAWK MISSILE SALE. "REPRESENTATIVES OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY" INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, ALL RAYTHEON COMPANY EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS, ALL EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS OF MANUFACTURERS OF COMPONENTS OF THE HAWK MISSILE SYSTEM, AND ALL EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS OF ANY FINANCE INSTITUTION (INCLUDING FINANCE INSTITUTIONS CONTROLLED OR AFFILIATED WITH ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT).

ANSWER:

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HAS NOT ENTERED INTO ANY AGREEMENT WITH RAYTHEON COMPANY (THE MANUFACTURER OF HAWK) RELATIVE TO SALE OF THE SYSTEM TO JORDAN. RAYTHEON COMPANY AND OTHER CONTRACTORS HAVE FURNISHED PROPOSALS FOR HARDWARE IN SUPPORT OF THIS SALE, AND THE DATA IS INCLUDED IN THE US GOVERNMENT'S OFFER. ONLY UPON ACCEPTANCE OF THE LETTER OF OFFER WILL THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY NEGOTIATE A CONTRACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY. THERE HAS BEEN NO DISCUSSION WITH US FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. AS DISCUSSED EARLIER, THE LETTER OF OFFER, IF ACCEPTED, WILL BE SIGNED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN WHICH WILL THEN BE HELD COMMITTED TO MEETING THE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE CONTRACT. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE USG INVOLVEMENT IN JORDAN'S NEGOTIATIONS TO SECURE FUNDS TO MEET THESE OBLIGATIONS.

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SINCE THE SUPPLY OF REDEYE MISSILE SYSTEM TO JORDAN WOULD BE FROM EXISTING US ARMY ASSETS, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED

FOR DISCUSSION WITH OR TRANSMISSION OF DOCUMENTS TO
PRIVATE INDUSTRY.

(19) THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF ALL AGREEMENTS, DOCUMENTS,
LETTERS, MEMORANDUMS, AND/OR OTHER WRITTEN MATERIAL IN
THE POSSESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHICH RELATE TO ALL
SALES COMMISSIONS OR FEES RELATED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, TO
THE HAWK MISSILE SYSTEM SALE, PAYABLE BY ANY ENTITY
INVOLVED IN THE SALE TO ANY PERSON.

ANSWER:

ACCORDING TO THE RAYTHEON COMPANY'S PROPOSAL OF JUNE 9,
1975, IT WAS STATED THAT THE COMPANY HAS AGREEMENTS WITH
REPRESENTATIVES OF JORDANIAN NATIONALITY TO PAY A FEE OF
2 PERCENT OF THE CONTRACT PRICE. THIS FEE IS INCLUDED IN
THE PROPOSAL AS 2 PERCENT OF THE "NOT TO EXCEED" PRICE.
THE NAMES OF PERSON OR PERSONS ACTING AS REPRESENTATIVES
ON BEHALF OF THE RAYTHEON COMPANY HAVE NOT BEEN FURNISHED
BY THE COMPANY. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THESE COSTS ARE
PROPERLY ALLOWABLE OR WILL BE DISALLOWED WILL BE RESOLVED
BY THE CONTRACTING OFFICER DURING CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE ARMED FORCES PROCUREMENT
REGULATIONS.

THERE ARE NO FEES INVOLVED IN THE REDEYE MISSILE TRANS-
ACTION.

(20) WITH RESPECT TO THE REDEYE ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILE
SYSTEM, ALL OF THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY THIS RESOLUTION
WITH RESPECT TO THE HAWK MISSILE SYSTEM.

ANSWER:

DATA ON THE REDEYE SYSTEM HAS BEEN ANSWERED IN THE PRE-
CEDING PARAGRAPHS WITH THAT PERTAINING TO HAWK. END QUOTE.
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